I kid you not. Fantasy baseball invented what Warren Buffet calls “financial weapons of mass destruction” – synthetic derivatives.
As we all know fantasy sports provide an answer to the age-old puzzle: I’m getting older. I can’t play any sport too well anymore, and never really could. But I think I’m smart enough to manage a professional team. The problem, of course, is not my prodigious talents. Rather it is the supply of major league baseball teams – there are only 30. Due to reasons beyond my control (connections, not talent) I’m not likely to get my chance. So for six months of the year I have to watch some jerk manage my favorite team.

Along comes fantasy baseball and it solves the supply problem. It creates an unlimited number of teams to be managed. I now can let it rip. Also, it allows me to gamble, yet another activity that goes hand in glove with sports.
We didn’t know it at the time, but your favorite pastime – rotisserie baseball – provided the perfect model for Wall Street. It solved their supply problem. It solved it so well that it nearly took down the world economy.
You see Wall Street got into its own game of fantasy finance. It started when a few large firms realized that they could make heaps of money, I mean heaps, by pooling high risk loans, mortgages and other forms of junk debts, and then slicing up the pools into securities that made it appear as if the risk had been removed.
Somehow, the large firms – you know the names – were able to persuade the rating agencies to bless most of those slices with AAA ratings, and those slices returned higher interest rates than other AAA-rated securities. So major investors flocked to them. The big profits came from packaging them, selling them and trading them. It turned into the most lucrative enterprise in the history of finance. (For all the gory details and comic relief click here.)
But our blessed bankers had a problem similar to the one we managers faced with baseball. There was a limited supply of junk debt. At first they scoured the country for more and more subprime loans and such, which of course, encouraged their proliferation from South Beach to Las Vegas. But it still was an awkward, clunky process. You had to get someone to make the loans, you had to get title to thousands of them for your pools, you had to package them up — all of which cost you time and money. And it put you in a risky position since you were holding all that junk – kind of like getting stuck with a roster full of injured players.
So some genius financial engineer figured out how to break the bottleneck. Let’s create a fantasy layer of derivatives so that we don’t have to own the real thing. We can do it all AS IF we owned the underlying real assets.
Here’s how they did it. Imagine that each synthetic security is the same thing as a fantasy baseball team. The synthetic financial security, like your team, goes up or down in value depending on how the underlying assets perform, be they subprime loans or major league baseball players. You can measure how much up or down based on their numbers, pure and simple. Bingo, you no longer have a supply problem.
In effect each of our fantasy baseball teams is a synthetic derivative. It “derives” its value based on how 700 or so real major league baseball players perform. If your team does well, it goes up in value – that is you are likely to be in the money at the end of the season.
Same goes for synthetic CDOs. In effect they provide insurance against default for those slices of the junk debt pools. The better the underlying debt performs, the more value for the synthetic CDOs have. As long as there is a market of buyers and sellers for the synthetic version, there is no limit to how many you can create.
In both fantasy finance and in fantasy baseball, this builds an upside down pyramid teetering on something real. Those 700 major league baseball players are at the bottom point of the pyramid, the only “tangible” asset in our beloved game. Above them are millions of fantasy baseball teams. I hate to break it to you, but all of them are synthetic and worthless without those 700 real players doing their thing.

Our fantasy teams also sit in the middle of their own little economy. Around them are a supply industry of stat services, books, magazines and websites. Some of the big boys, like ESPN, might actually be making some real money from it all.
In Wall Street’s fantasy finance game, the tangible assets are the homes that support the junk debt, that support the pooled slices, that support the insurance policies on those slices. This upside down pyramid based on those houses also includes bizarre synthetic products like CDOs squared and cubed. And yes, there is quite an economy built up around them – like most of the world’s financial system.
Here’s the rub. Since the entire fantasy finance upside pyramid rested on housing prices, bad things can happen when those prices stop rising. In fact all that has to happen was for housing prices to flatten. They didn’t have to fall in order to crash the entire pyramid of debt.
Let me put this in stark terms than even the most financially challenged fantasy baseball owner can understand: What happens when there’s a strike or lockout? Yep, it’s good by fantasy baseball. All of our wonderful fantasy teams turn into……toxic assets with no value!
And the entire fantasy baseball economy comes crashing down as well – no stat services, no books (including one that I wrote and lost during the last baseball strike. Unfortunately, there was no TARP program to bail me out.)
So when housing prices leveled out it was as if the major leagues went on strike. But fantasy finance is just a bit more potent than our cherished pastime. When it crashed, it led very quickly to a global economic meltdown. The big boys on Wall Street play with a lot more chips.
So next time you’re tempted to blame Obama or Goldman Sachs or Greenspan for the crash, think also of those deranged lads who gave birth to fantasy baseball some 30 years ago at La Rotisserie Française in New York.






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I don't really understand all this complicated finance crap. But it does seem that instead of captains of industry getting rich providing the country with tangible things like steel, railroads, automoblies, energy or some other useful products, our economy is driven by con men and paper shufflers pushing silly gimmicks.
[...] link: » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … Share and [...]
Bretton-Woods – a ponzie scheme grasping for it's last breaths
If you like fantasy, try carbon credits.
[...] Pete Williams wrote an interesting post today Here’s a quick excerpt Along comes fantasy baseball and it solves the supply problem. It creates an unlimited number of teams to be managed. I now can let it rip. Also, it allows me to gamble, yet another activity that goes hand in glove with sports. … [...]
Gosh Les
Now that I know and understand how this mess was created, I sure feel alot better…
This was all done with the un-holy trinity of Washington Politicians (both parties), K-Street lobbyist, and Wall Street bankers. 30 to 1 derivatives are insane, use the inverted pyramid where $1.00 is holding up $29.00 …what could be wrong with that? …sheesh! As we start to right this country over several election cycles, this symbiotic relationship needs to be destroyed!
30 to 1 is insane… agree and it sounds very familiar. Alot like fractional banking practices of fed/res and Bretton-Woods. 1913 was a very bad year.
This is the lesson that was learned from Enron. It is easier and more lucrative to sell the illusion of value than actually creating something of value and then selling that. And as long as the government is around to shift the cost to us idiot taxpayers, there certainly isn't any real danger to the big finance guys. Even if they get fired, they already have their loot.
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World Economy – Big Journalism [...]
Oh yeah! Washington politicians, K-Street, and Wall Street, were all together with Ken Lay, thick as thieves. Ken Lay was one of the creeps in the ‘90s that gave us the dumbass concept of “carbon offsets.” I wonder if Owlgore puts flowers on his grave?
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The near-destruction of our economy and the subsequent upheaval in our country can be directly linked to the incestuous relationship of private and public, the breakdown of the society due to social-engineering, the Community Reinvestment Act, the removal of almost all market regulation and the lure of easy money. Can't help but think though, that this has always been part of the plan, to create the perfect storm, the crisis they've been waiting for to secure the centralization of power needed to drive us into third-world status. Has history taught us nothing? Personally, I don't believe it's to late but maybe we'll need to go through the looking-glass a get a glimpse of our future.
This is the dumbest perspective on rehashed data i have ever seen. Not that fantasy league anything isn't dumb.
The concept itself is not a problem. The problem is the underlying leverage permitted by the regulators, the 30:1 ratio. This meant that there was insufficient skin in the game and guaranteed that the risk reward ratio of these investments was out of alignment with competing investments in other categories. This was a result of imprudent regulation, not lack of regulation as many on the left claim. This also demonstrates the myth that regulation can prevent such catastrophes.
You say the removal of almost all market regulation, but it was the exact opposite that caused the problem. The regulations gave a preference for mortgage backed securities which then led to a demand for mortgage backed securities.
Say a bank has $10m, the government regulates how much paper they can buy with that money. If the banks buy government bonds or mortgage backed securities, they can buy $500m worth of paper with that $10m, where as, if they buy some other type of note, they could only buy $100m worth. This means, that the banks, wanting to maximize profits and minimize potential losses invested into mortgage backed securities that paid a higher return rate than government bonds and at a rate of 5 times the quantity of other notes. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac backing of these papers made them seem to be very low risk. Any risk that may have been there was backed up by an insurance policy bought at a place like Bear Sterns or AIG. Regulations limited the scope of risk assessment by limiting the market to only two ratings companies, Moodies and some other one. Because that left the market bare of competition, the ratings companies became lax in how they rated risk, and erred on the side of those wanting to see no risk or low risk. So, with a high demand for mortgage backed securities, smaller banks and lending institutions raced to fill the demand and lowered the bar for what would pass as a qualified borrower. The lax oversight on these securities by the risk rating entities falsely enticed banks into buying these securities, and the implicit backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac added to that false sense of security. Bear Sterns and other insurance companies were misled by the false AAA ratings, and were taking on far more risk than the premiums they were charging could back up. All these regulations fed into the hyper inflation of housing markets.
Thus we have a situation that was nearly 100% caused by government regulation. Housing prices at about 150% of real value, banks over extended on risky paper, insurance companies significantly under funded for the real risk. Then the market correction started to happen. House prices started to fall and the 'AAA' mortgage backed securities turned into their true junk bond ratings. Because most banks were highly leveraged 50:1 because that was what government regulations suggested was proper, the market to sell these junk bond mortgage backed securities dried up. This is when another government regulation kicked into high gear, as soon as there was no market to sell these securities to, the new value became 0, instead of perhaps the 50%-80% that they were really worth. The insurance companies went bankrupt and could not pay the banks what they lost. Thus, banks that had a 50:1 leverage became banks with essentially an infinite:1 leverage which pushed them into failed status.
Every single bit of the problem was caused directly by government regulation, including the other regulations you specified. One thing that did not lead to this disaster was the deregulation of the market. If the market was not overly regulated to the point of giving preference to mortgage backed securities, then it is very likely that the herd mentality of chasing mortgage backed securities would never have happened, and our whole economy would not have been placed in a single nest ready to be broken. Unregulated banks would have diversified and spread the risk through many parts of the economy which likely would have avoided every bit of this entire fiasco.
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What a perfect analogy Mr. Leopold. Thank you thank you thank you.
Now we have 7 months and the perfect analogy that Middle America can understand to turn the Titantic back to port before the oceans swallows this great nation.
Synthetic Bell Curves? Prison in my eyes is hardly justice. And burning them at the stake will only give us martyrs (how Greek). I say guillotine but I'm open to a firing squad plea bargain.
Put regulators and ratings agencies in straight jackets AND on payroll.
We are in a rat race with The Jokers and the Banksters – collectively The Rats. They are racing to the November elections. And we are racing past the poll booths to the guillotine on the other side. Time will tell who wins.
But if we win that sprint the people we line up will be Congress. They are the ultimate Gatekeepers after We The People. None of this gets by them unless of course they were co-conspirators. Which they were.
Bastille Day.
Gentle Readers,
Dear Tempus_Fugit,
It's simple; A normal Derivative is simply an Option: A contract to buy something on a certain data at a set price. For example: I might contract with a farmer to buy 1000 bushels of wheat for $5/bushel on 15 July. Now, if the price on that date is $6, I make money, and the farmer loses. If it's only $4, I lost money, and the farmer gets his $5.
Synthetic Derivatives have NOTHING AT ALL under contract, period.
No wheat, no oil, no copper, steel, coal, iron…. NOTHING!
I'm old enough to remember when that was actually illegal.
So, firms made big dough …. trading….nothing at all.
This is what people don't understand: If I sell a car, a piano, a couch, etc, but don't actually have the goods, I get arrested, right?
How come these guys aren't sitting in jail??
Kindest Regards to all,
I am,
John Lepant
Brighton
CO
And, John Lepant, under whose watch and at whose behest did it cease to be illegal? Like most, I don't have the time or formal education to understand "Wall Street".
Why aren't they in jail? Who benefited from letting them play fast and loose with the "rules"? Who changed the rules? Who are they only people that can either change OR enforce the rules?
I don't read the paper, so I can't be sure, but, are any Wall Street guys friends with any politicians? Do they donate to either party or anybody's campaign effort?
Sorry, the venom is not aimed at you, but "…firms made big dough …. trading….nothing at all." just set me off. I already knew that much, but you put it so succinctly. Thanks for the great explanation. +1 from me…
Time for a beer.
Thanks for the great explanation. I know less about this than I would like, but that is another great benefit of this site. I think LizardLips was right as well. My interpretation of what he meant by "the removal of almost all market regulation" was merely shorthand for your more detailed explanation as to why "government regulation" distorted the market and caused the mess. The "incestuous relationship", as LL called it, is surely the reason nobody has gone to jail. Lots of very prominent heads would roll if an honest, public and well reported investigation/analysis were to be given the prominence its importance commands.
People with recommended reading for someone like me to understand financial stuff better: PLEASE respond with good suggestions!
Lots of excellent posts so far! Keep em coming!
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … [...]
Were you drinking at the time?
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … [...]
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … [...]
GF
Never in the AM
Now I am …It's Beer30 PST !! Here on the Plains…yippie!!
This is ignorant at best. First things first. You should get your acronyms correct. I would appear you are talking about a "CDS" rather than a "CDO"
"Same goes for synthetic CDOs. In effect they provide insurance against default for those slices of the junk debt pools. The better the underlying debt performs, the more value for the synthetic CDOs have."
CDO = Collateralized Debt Obligations (includes CMO's) – pools of debt securities, e.g., bonds against which securities are sold.
CMO = Collateralized Mortgage Obligations – pools of mortgages against which securities are sold.
CDS = Credit Default Swaps – a form of insurance contract on a fixed income security, which protects against a loss in value.
Derivatives serve a very useful purpose. They are vehicles which investors can use to manage their risk and their tolerance to risk.
"What Does Derivative Mean?
A security whose price is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is merely a contract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes. Most derivatives are characterized by high leverage."
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.as...
Some common derivatives: options, futures, interest rate indexes, interest rate swaps, etc. Even a Mutual Fund could be considered a derivative, though it doesn't generally involve leverage.
Derivatives are a vehicle which transfers risk for a price. Just like car insurance, health insurance (generally), life insurance, etc. and if priced correctly, they are generally very useful to society. If you have a large investor or company looking to hedge one's investments or operations, someone who is a "risk taker" has to be on the other side. A good example is oil futures. An airline uses large amounts of jet fuel. They are subject to price fluctuations in the price of jet fuel quite often due to the price fluctuations in crude oil.
They can partially hedge themselves against changes in the price of oil by buying futures contracts. This in effect partially locks in the price of jet fuel for their immediate future so they can price tickets being sold months in advance and be assured that their fuel costs will not eat up their margins on already booked flights. Also, they can do this on a 5% margin. Given that they may be hedging billions in fuel cost, if this margin were higher it would tie up a significant amount of operating cash and make the cost of flying much greater.
You are blaming the symptom rather than the true cause of the financial crisis (a typical populist reaction). Greed is an inherent human trait.
Here is Merriam Webster’s definition of greed.
greed: a selfish and excessive desire for more of something (as money) than is needed
By mere definition and a rather negative definition it is, this would mean that the American Dream is inherently “greedy.” My guess it the people responsible for publishing this dictionary are somewhat anti-capitalist, but I digress.
There is rational greed and irrational greed. Rational greed is the entrepreneur who takes risks in order to build a company and in the process gets rich but also creates many jobs for his community and increases the success of his/her suppliers and customers with who he does business. Irrational greed is the Bernie Madoff type of greed, which makes money intentionally at the expense of others without providing or attempting to provide any honest value others, e.g., fraud, theft, etc.
The true cause of the financial crisis rests at the feet of the government. The government set up the system through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Reserve, financial regulations, etc. They injected the risk into the system and hid that risk along the way. They created the housing bubble through their loose monetary policy and using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and private money to further their government social policy under the guess of capitalism and private industry. It’s a scheme that makes Enron look like child’s play but of course no one is going to jail for this one.
v
Looks like Obamacare is gonna pass. I know it ain't over yet, but it might be a good time to invest in companies that make, import or distribute cheap vodka.
видеть Вас в ад товарищ Obama!
GF
They (the dims) have cut their own throats for the future…
The thing is they start collecting taxes immediately but there is no difference in the system until 2013..
We're gonna see how things shake out for a year or so before we make any big changes…Then maybe, drop coverage until something big happens, then buy a catastrophic policy ..
.Eventually everything will crash down… no more insurance companies, shortage of doctors, long waits for most procedures…
The proglodites will be ecstatic…They will have socialized medicine but no health care…I hope they all die waiting in line……Me and LOL, are gonna making a deal with a doc and pay cash…
Bad economy …more taxes…clockwise death spiral…pass the Jamison's…
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … [...]
HiPD
Make a deal with a doc? Sure that ain't illegal? Probably tucked somewhere in there on page "1600".
About 8 years ago I was between jobs and had no coverage. I needed to see a doc to allay my fears on a matter and called a local office. How much for a visit, I asked "$125.00", she said. "$125.00!?!?" I replied in shock and horror (remember, unemployed (not accepting gov. money either!)). "Who is your insurance Co.?" "I don't have Ins.!" "Oh? How will you be paying?" "Probably by check" "$60.00 then" "Oh, okay!"… So I get there and the doc says everything is alright. I go to pay and she says "$90.00 please" "but they told me $60.00 on the phone!" Well, the doc was walking by just then and overheard. He intervenes and asks "how much cash you got on you?" I checked and answered "$46.00" He said "That's fine". I went home, he probably hit the links. Absolutely true story. It was worth 2/3rds of the fee not to have to chase the payment or report it as income. Tells ya something about 3rd party payer and over-regulation/excessive mandates eh? Have an HSA myself now, cant wait till they bend me over and take it away. I pay ~$140.00/mo for just me ($5k ded!). I guess under the Gov't plan I will just pay the penalty…
Since you didn't ask… "видеть Вас в ад товарищ Obama! " means "See you in hell Comrade Obama!"
My regards to LOL and Master Sgt FUBAR.
Jamison's passed…
GF
I think most here have experianced the doc situation you just alluded to…All Econ 101 grads understand this …
Third party payers are a big part of the problem…and no actual ability to pay relationship between the consumer and the service provider…….Somebody else's nickel….
A veritable 800lb gorilla in the room, that no prog will even discuss
It's NOT about health care…It's all about control and redistribution…
LOL sez hi!
видеть Вас в ад товарищ—FUBAR indeed!!
A common misconception is that the financial crisis and the mortgage meltdown were due to deregulation but clearly history does not bear this out. During the Bush administration we saw the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Bush Administration published 75,000 pages of new or proposed rules in the Federal Register in 2004 alone.
The only financial deregulation we have seen in the past 12 years or so came during the Clinton Administration. It was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which repealed a portion of the Glass-Steagall Act. It allowed Commercial Banks and Investment Banks to be owned by the same parent company. This repeal actually aided the financial crisis by allowing Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch to be acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America, and allowed Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to convert to bank holding companies.
The only failure “to regulate” was the failure of the Congress to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both Government Sponsored entities executing the social policies of Congress. It was a policy of financing mortgages for poor people by using private sector money rather than through direct government subsidies. Fannie and Freddie also received private funds at a discount because they were seen as being less risky as they had implicit government backing. It was a scheme that would have made Enron proud, i.e., off balance sheet financing. Fannie and Freddie are NOT subject to Sarbanes-Oxley.
The reality is that this whole thing was facilitated by bad government policy in the first place. It started with the Federal Reserve's loose money policy, which really drove both the Tech Bubble and the Housing Bubble. Then it was Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac funneling that money into the mortgage market and buying up subprime and Alt-A loans from lenders. Lenders who now were loan originators, made fees from every loan they made and didn't have to bear the risk. When people with good ratings and income could no longer qualify for regular loans due to increased housing prices (demand created by a greater supply of mortgage loans), the loan originators changed the qualification rules, i.e., Alt-A loans.
Next it was the ratings agencies, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s. Regulatory capital requirements for banks when holding specific fixed income securities, is based on ratings assigned by the ratings agencies. These subprime & Alt A loans were packaged into CMO’s (Collateralized Mortgage Obligations). The resulting derivative securities were rated as AAA or at a minimum, investment grade.
These CMO’s are inherently opaque as a pool may contain thousands of mortgages that were given out by a mortgage broker then sold to a bank who in turn sold it to Fannie or Freddie who then pooled it into a CMO. If any of these loans were “Ninja” i.e., no income, no asset, and no job verification, how would one expect to determine the underlying risk?
Then Fannie and Freddie bought up many of the CMO’s issued on the mortgage pools they held in order to provide “liquidity” to the market. This provided a false sense of liquidity (and value) to the market as it was fueled by two big government organizations rather than true free market participants.
You also had derivatives being created on derivatives. There were Wall Street firms who bought certain “tranches” or slices of CMO pools and pooled them to create a new issue of CMO’s. This provided an additional level of opaqueness as to the risk of the underlying loans (as if there wasn’t enough already).
And last of all, you had Elliot Spitzer suing the investment banks for how they used analysts. The result was a $1.4 billion settlement and more regulation as to how analysts could be used. The banks could no longer afford as many analysts and layed off a large number. Analysts are the people who investigate and research markets and securities and alert banks and investors to risks.
Then you had AIG writing insurance polices (CDS’s) on CMO’s rated as AAA by ratings agencies (as required by government regulations). If these CMO’s had been rated properly do you think the price of the CDS’s would have been more reflective of the risk? If the price of these polices had been higher do you think as many CDS’s would have been issued? This is the equivalent of a 70 year old man buying an 20 year life insurance policy saying he is only 30 years old to get a lower premium.
So to recap, why were investors and banks not risk adverse? Probably because they didn’t do their homework as to what the real risk was and it was easy to assume the best because of a false sense of security in the US Government. But in reality the government, government regulation and regulators were the “drug pushers” for the market’s addiction and it was easy to assume that since Fannie and Freddie were behind the mortgages and the government would not let them "fail", that CMO’s must be good investments. The rating agencies even blessed the CMO's with the best ratings, so how could they not be a good investment?
continued…
The reality is, even acknowledging the bad behavior by elements of Wall Street, by banks and loan originators or brokers, and even borrows who should have know they couldn’t pay the loans back, if you take the government out of the equation, we wouldn’t be where we are today. Government regulation and regulators give people a false sense of security. It’s like the fence next to the cliff that looks sturdy and new, but as soon as you lean on it, it falls over. The more we ask government to protect us, the more problems and failures occur and the more we are blind-sided by them. Then the government uses their failure to justify more regulation and more spending.
continued…
Then Fannie and Freddie bought up many of the CMO’s issued on the mortgage pools they held in order to provide “liquidity” to the market. This provided a false sense of liquidity (and value) to the market as it was fueled by two big government organizations rather than true free market participants.
You also had derivatives being created on derivatives. There were Wall Street firms who bought certain “tranches” or slices of CMO pools and pooled them to create a new issue of CMO’s. This provided an additional level of opaqueness as to the risk of the underlying loans (as if there wasn’t enough already).
And last of all, you had Elliot Spitzer suing the investment banks for how they used analysts. The result was a $1.4 billion settlement and more regulation as to how analysts could be used. The banks could no longer afford as many analysts and layed off a large number. Analysts are the people who investigate and research markets and securities and alert banks and investors to risks.
Then you had AIG writing insurance polices (CDS’s) on CMO’s rated as AAA by ratings agencies (as required by government regulations). If these CMO’s had been rated properly do you think the price of the CDS’s would have been more reflective of the risk? If the price of these polices had been higher do you think as many CDS’s would have been issued? This is the equivalent of a 70 year old man buying an 20 year life insurance policy saying he is only 30 years old to get a lower premium.
So to recap, why were investors and banks not risk adverse? Probably because they didn’t do their homework as to what the real risk was and it was easy to assume the best because of a false sense of security in the US Government. But in reality the government, government regulation and regulators were the “drug pushers” for the market’s addiction and it was easy to assume that since Fannie and Freddie were behind the mortgages and the government would not let them "fail", that CMO’s must be good investments. The rating agencies even blessed the CMO's with the best ratings, so how could they not be a good investment?
The reality is, even acknowledging the bad behavior by elements of Wall Street, by banks and loan originators or brokers, and even borrows who should have know they couldn’t pay the loans back, if you take the government out of the equation, we wouldn’t be where we are today. Government regulation and regulators give people a false sense of security. It’s like the fence next to the cliff that looks sturdy and new, but as soon as you lean on it, it falls over. The more we ask government to protect us, the more problems and failures occur and the more we are blind-sided by them. Then the government uses their failure to justify more regulation and more spending.
continued…
Here are my sources:
A Silver Lining to the Financial Crisis: A More Realistic View of Capitalism
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704...
A bank's capital reserve represents funds that are not borrowed–funds that, therefore, need not eventually be paid back to someone, such as a bank's depositors. Thus, an important source of a bank's capital reserve is funds from selling shares of stock in a bank. These funds can be costly to acquire, as one expert has pointed out:
For corporations (including banks) not eligible for Subchapter S earnings pass-through treatment, the after-tax cost of equity capital, say 12 to 15 percent, is substantially greater than the after-tax cost of debt, which is generally in the 3 to 5 percent range.
By reducing their capital holdings, banks can, at least in principle, increase their profitability.
But under the recourse rule, "well-capitalized" American commercial banks were required to spend 80 percent more capital on commercial loans, 80 percent more capital on corporate bonds, and 60 percent more capital on individual mortgages than they had to spend on asset-backed securities, including mortgage-backed bonds, as long as these bonds were rated AA or AAA or were issued by a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), such as Fannie or Freddie. Specifically, $2 in capital was required for every $100 in mortgage-backed bonds, compared to $5 for the same amount in mortgage loans and $10 for the same amount in commercial loans.
The Latest AIG Story
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704...
Will regulators ever coherently explain why AIG could not be allowed to go bankrupt in September of 2008?
At yesterday's House hearing, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and predecessor Hank Paulson said they didn't bail out AIG to save its derivatives counterparties. Instead, said Mr. Geithner, the now-famous 100-cents-on-the-dollar buyouts of credit default swap contracts were necessary to prevent a further downgrade of AIG by credit-ratings agencies.
This topic probably deserves another hearing on its own. Remember, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where Mr. Geithner was president, had by that time already seized AIG. We're guessing that a ratings agency is pretty comfortable with the creditworthiness of a firm 79.9%-owned by Uncle Sam. Yet Mr. Geithner is saying that the same credit raters that applied triple-A ratings to tranches of junk mortgages somehow got the yips when the world's most respected borrower was standing behind AIG.
If the agencies had applied to AIG the credit rating of its new owner, there wouldn't have been much need to send more collateral to such counterparties as Goldman Sachs. Instead, AIG could have demanded the return of some of the collateral it had already posted. Bad news for those counterparties.
continued…
WSJ.com: Let's Write the Rating Agencies Out of Our Law
By Robert Rosenkranz
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12308607373834805...
“We should not, but the regulators have, and that is the problem. Regulators of banks, insurance companies and broker dealers have all incorporated the work of the ratings agencies into their regulations in myriad ways. Most importantly, bond ratings determine — as a matter of law — how much capital regulated institutions need in order to own the bonds.
For every dollar of equity that insurance companies are required to hold for bonds rated AAA, $3 is needed for bonds rated BBB, and $11 is needed for bonds rated just below investment grade (BB). For banks, the sensitivity of capital requirements to ratings is generally even more extreme.
…..
Indeed, that is the entire raison d'être of the $6 trillion structured-finance business, which serves little economic function other than as a rating-agency arbitrage. Subprime mortgages (and all manner of other risky loans) held directly by financial institutions are questionable assets with high associated capital charges. Each one alone would deserve a "junk" rating. Structured finance simply piles such risky assets into bundles and slices the bundles into tranches. The rating agencies deemed some 85% of the tranches by value as AAA, and nearly 99% as investment grade– thus turning dross into gold by a sort of ratings alchemy."
The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up
Barney Frank's decision to 'roll the dice' on subsidized housing is becoming an epic disaster for taxpayers.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703...
“There is more to this ugly situation. New research by Edward Pinto, a former chief credit officer for Fannie Mae and a housing expert, has found that from the time Fannie and Freddie began buying risky loans as early as 1993, they routinely misrepresented the mortgages they were acquiring, reporting them as prime when they had characteristics that made them clearly subprime or Alt-A.”
Congress' Financial Mess
http://townhall.com/columnists/WalterEWilliams/20...
Maybe the Banks Are Just Counting Wrong
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12218651556215867...
AmericanThinker.com: Why the Mortgage Crisis Happened
By M. Jay Wells
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/10/what_reall...
Video of the CSPAN congressional hearings on the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Accounting scandal which came to light in 2004.
see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MGT_cSi7Rs
Clinton administration's "BANK AFFIRMATIVE ACTION"
Andrew Cuomo references a Federal Reserve Report that was later discredited.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivmL-lXNy64
IBDeditorials.com: How the Fed, Media and Academia Aided and Abetted Lending Debacle
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article….
WSJ.com: A Mortgage Fable
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12220407816126118...
WSJ.com: The Fannie Mae Gang
By Paul A. Gigot
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12167705016067539...
NationalReview.com: Inside Obama’s ACORN
By Stanley Kurtz
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NDZiMjkwMDcz...
IBDeditorials.com: Congress Tries To Fix What It Broke
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article….
WSJ.com: Faith in Ratings
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12221266858956522...
WSJ.com: The Moody's Blues
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12030364147827021...
WSJ.com: AAA Oligopoly
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12039875459239226...
WSJ.com: Most Pundits Are Wrong About the Bubble
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12242827064124604...
WSJ.com: Another 'Deregulation' Myth
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12242820141024601...
WSJ.com: Spitzer and Sarbox Were Deregulation?
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12254160910938672...
WSJ.com: The Ratings Racket
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12143505139130151...
WSJ.com: Information Haves and Have-Nots
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12220338206886094...
WSJ.com: The Meltdown That Wasn't – A primer on credit default swaps, the latest Beltway scapegoat.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12267041190972968...
WSJ.com: Bad Accounting Rules Helped Sink AIG
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12216932042144984...
WSJ.com: Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12253844972278463...
NYTimes.com: Dear A.I.G., I Quit! http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/opinion/25desan...
SeattlePI.com: Activists vent at AIG executives http://www.seattlepi.com/business/404117_aigbus22...
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Gentle Readers,
Dear kvangs,
What you wrote isn't quite correct: You probably mistakenly mixed the CDS's with the Options Contracts.
Discussing futures contracts for a commodity or good, such as aviation fuel, with a CDS, which essentially trades
nothing at all, is somewhat misleading, although I presume you didn't intend to mislead.
The perfectly true point of this article is that firms made large amounts of money trading contracts for literally NOTHING: no aviation fuel, no mortgage, no coal, no iron, no steel, no oil……. NOTHING AT ALL was contracted.
Your real problem isn't that us ' rubes ' just don't understand all of this complex financial dealings, the trouble for you and many others is that we do understand perfectly well! Trading Options Contracts for NOTHING used to be illegal. So far as I know, selling NOTHING is still illegal.
Kindest Regards,
John Lepant
Brighton
CO
John,
Traders who trade futures generally do not take possession of the actual commodity. They are only trading on the price volatility, so the majority of futures contracts are offset against other futures contracts. Do you think the airline in my example actually takes possession of the crude oil?
As far as the CDS's being based on nothing, this is not true. It is no different then having multiple people placing insurance policies on your life. If you are an executive of a large corporation which depends upon your expertise it wouldn't be uncommon to have your company hold an insurance policy on your life, your wife could hold an insurance policy on your life, and your mortgage company could hold an insurance policy on your life in the event you die and can't pay your mortgage.
They are contracts based on the value of an underlying asset. Another type of derivative, Interest rate swaps have been around for many years and large institutions use them to hedge their cost of funds. For example a bank that takes deposits and pays interest based on the Fed Funds rate but lends money at the LIBOR rate, may find a counterparty that is willing to swap Fed Funds rate for LIBOR based on an amount the bank feels it needs to "lock in". In this way the Bank will not be "squeezed" if the Fed Funds Rate rises but LIBOR stays constant.
In any derivatives market there are people that give risk and there are people that take risk. As long as the risk is relatively known, the market is efficient in its pricing
Gentle Readers,
Dear kvangs,
Again, sorry to belabor the point, but you've missed the point of this article, which is that Derivatives, i.e., contracts, were written which had NOTHING AT ALL backing the contract.
Lets reconsider your Mortgage Backed Security, and assume all you say is true: A $10,000 bond is purchased by a firm with only $1000 capital on a 10% contract as the bond is incorrectly rated as AAA. It is a ' leveraged ' buy with a commercial bank loaning the $9000 difference.
Later, it turns out to be only a BBB bond worth only $8000. Our tiny investment firm loses its $1000 capital and must turn over it's $8000 bond to its lender, who is unhappy that it has an asset worth only $8000 covering a $9000 loan.
However, IT ACTUALLY HAS A BOND WORTH $8000 !!!
This is common in the securities business. Buy a stock for $20, and it goes down to $16, or goes up to $25. The bond worth $8000 today may be worth $12,000 3 years from now!
Now, lets compare that to a Synthetic Derivative, BACKED BY NOTHING AT ALL! Investment firm goes broke, and the bank takes as collateral………..NOTHING! No bond, no oil, no wheat, no coal, no mortgages……..NOTHING!
Now our banker is holding a piece of paper worth NOTHING! They get no mortgages, no oil, aviation fuel… nothing. If the loan amount was the same, $9000, its a complete loss, with no hope for recovery of the lost capital!
The ' Synthetic Derivatives ' discussed in this article were not backed by mortgages, commodities or anything. Traders made huge amounts of money, literally billions of dollars, handing trades for contracts and creating contracts for NOTHING.
Kindest Regards,
John
Hey kvangs,
Read my book before you call me ignorant. I think you need to do a bit more homework on synthetic CDOs (which is the marriage of a CDS and a CDO.) Here's the first chapter on how that kind of derivative was pawned off on five Wisconsin school districts.
Here's the first chapter which you can read for free: http://www.alternet.org/economy/140208/the_lootin...
best,
Les
a little off topic, but since you brought it up… 'greed' is an entirely subjective abstract concept with no objective meaning in a practical economic sense. one man's greed is another's ambition. it's impossible to define anything when everybody is entitled to their own definition. your categorizing it as rational or irrational should be more accurately described as legal vs. illegal.
Les,
One: If you had read the rest of my posts and the links to the articles, which I listed, you would have seen that the reason those underlying assets were rated AAA was due to the very regulations that people believe are necessary to protect them.
Two: Derivatives are a tool. Blaming them for the failures of humans is absurd, just as absurd as blaming guns for robberies. They serve a purpose if used correctly. If used incorrectly they can be devastating. Should we regulate "swamp land" because some fool bought a piece of property sight unseen? Should we ban "Junk Bonds" because someone lost their shirt by investing their life savings in them?
Three: The person that you profile in your story should have known better than to "invest" in derivatives without first understanding what he was doing (just because someone is a "doctor" doesn't mean they have the experience to perform heart surgery). There are sales people in every industry that will tell one the benefits of their product but not the detriments. A prudent person should always look for the detriments, especially someone in charge of investing substantial sums of money. The government can't stop people from being stupid, nor should they try.
Four: Government regulation in most cases is the reason for many economic problems. It’s called the law of unintended consequences and it’s always the typical pattern. A problem occurs due to government imposed regulation. The government blames some populist scapegoat. The government rides to the rescue with more proposed regulation and consumer protections. It’s a vicious cycle. I believe the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.
A few more comments on your chapter:
"As Shaun Yde, the school district’s director of business services, put it, the goal was to 'guarantee a secure future for our employees without increasing the burden on our taxpayers or decreasing the funds available to our students to fund their education.' "
This was their first mistake. There are not guarantees in life and guaranteeing future benefits is the reason why so many public pension funds are in trouble. There is a good commentary on that in today's Wall Street Journal – see: "Public Pension Deficits Are Worse Than You Think – How can fund managers assume an 8% rate of return?" http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704...
The second issue is the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve's monetary policy has been extremely easy over the past 15 or so years. This is the reason for the tech bubble and the reason for the real estate/mortgage bubble. This has not been just a US phenomenon either, as Europe's central bank and Japan's central bank have had very low interest rates (greater money supply) that contributed to a world wide glut of pension fund money (as much as $40 trillion in 2005) looking for a home. This drove up asset prices, which lowered market rates of return on assets. For example it wasn't uncommon to see smaller multi-family properties being valued at capitalization rates of 3% to 5% in Los Angeles. Historically one would expect these rates of return on a longer term Certificate of Deposit, not a time consuming riskier asset.
The reality is that many investment managers started to ignore risk in search of the historical rates of return to which they were accustomed. When you combine this with the concept of "guaranteeing" benefits in public retirement programs, it is a sure recipe for disaster.
Yes, I would agree it is generally subjective but unfortunately, society doesn't care. Greed usually has a negative context and by its mere definition, they have defined anyone with "ambition" as greedy. I am saying there are many "greedy" people who benefit society in the process of benefitting themselves.
If Progressives/Socialists define all the "rules" then Capitalism, Ambition, Greed, the American Dream, etc. will always be bad things. They are by definition trying to group any anti-Socialist behavior as immoral based on their secular moral values (e.g., collective is good, individual is bad). I am trying to take back the ground by differentiating ethical greed from unethical greed (not everything that is legal is ethical and vice versa).
Hey GaltFan,
I've had the same thing happen with tests when we had a health savings account. Get a bill, call to ask about it, tell them we don't have insurance (still paying cash with the high deductible), and am told to forget about it. They knew they weren't going to see that money, or much of it.
The thing is, that tells me there's something that needed to be fixed. Since your story and mine came from about 8 years ago, it sure wasn't Obamacare.
[...] » Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball Crashed the World … [...]
[...] BASEBALL AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. The Baseball Musings blog linked to this article by Les Leopold with the provocative headline “Play Ball! How Rotisserie League Baseball [...]
John,
It's insurance. If you take out an insurance contract and you pay the premiums what is the collateral? What is it worth? An insurance policy protects against a loss. If there is no loss, it has no value.
Take an options buy contract. It may be based on a stock, but if the stock is trading at or below the strike price the only value the option contract has is based on the volatility of the underlying stock and the time to expiration. When it expires, voila! it's worth nothing if the stock price hasn't exceeded the strike price at expiration.
Then there is the writer of a buy contract. If he/she doesn't actually own the stock, the the stock price shoots up and exceeds the strike price by 4 times, he/she is now liable for difference.
The fact that you keep arguing this "based on NOTHING!" point only shows your ignorance of how derivatives markets work. Yes, one can take on a great deal of risk if one does not know what they are doing but these instruments are extremely useful in managing risk.
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