On Wednesday night, in an interview with Larry King, the author of what is surely one of the biggest pieces Rolling Stone has ever published revealed his true intentions behind the research and publication of his article.

King asked Michael Hastings, “Is there a part of you that feels bad for the General?” Hastings responded, after giving a bit of praise to McChrystal as an “impressive individual”, by saying “I think the problem becomes, in my view, is when guys like General McChrystal, who spent the last nine years fighting these wars… I think when war becomes your life, I think it’s very difficult to have the proper perspective to be able to create a fully balanced policy. And I think that’s what’s happened here: the policy between the military side of Afghanistan and the diplomatic side is totally out of whack and General McChrystal controlled both of them.”

So Hastings, when asked if he felt any remorse or any negative feelings at all about the fate of the General, responded by making a clear admission that the policy that he personally feels should be executed in Afghanistan was not the same policy that was being pursued by the General. (more…)

Need Bullets? The shortest distance between South Carolina and Kandahar is about 7,500 miles. (As the rocket flies.)

Shah Wali Kot, Afghanistan
11 March 2009

The military axiom that “amateurs talk strategy while professionals talk logistics” has special meaning in Afghanistan. During the Soviet war, though the Bear comprised Afghanistan’s entire northern border, the Afghan resistance was frequently able to block Soviet logistical operations, which were dependent on scant roads, tunnels and corridors. Captured Soviet logistics convoys often supplied the Mujahidin.

Logistics in landlocked Afghanistan are exceptionally tough because the country is a transportation nightmare of impassable mountains, barren deserts, and rugged landscape with only capillary roads and airports.

When we lose a bridge, we can’t just detour twenty miles to the next one, as we might on the plains of Europe.  In Afghanistan, there might not be another route for hundreds of miles. Conversely, Afghan fighters, who have used guerilla warfare tactics for decades—centuries even—lack our tanks, vehicles and massive supply lines, leaving them less dependent on infrastructure.  Most of the guerrillas we face are from the immediate area. Their corn comes from their own stalks; ours comes from other continents. (more…)